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Embodied understanding
Mark Johnson*
Department of Philosophy, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA
Western culture has inherited a view of understanding as an intellectual cognitive
operation of grasping of concepts and their relations. However, cognitive science
research has shown that this received intellectualist conception is substantially out of
touch with how humans actually make and experience meaning. The view emerging
from the mind sciences recognizes that understanding is profoundly embodied, insofar
as our conceptualization and reasoning recruit sensory, motor, and affective patterns
and processes to structure our understanding of, and engagement with, our world.
A psychologically realistic account of understanding must begin with the patterns of
ongoing interaction between an organism and its physical and cultural environments and
must include both our emotional responses to changes in our body and environment,
and also the actions by which we continuously transform our experience. Consequently,
embodied understanding is not merely a conceptual/propositional activity of thought, but
rather constitutes our most basic way of being in, and engaging with, our surroundings
in a deep visceral manner.
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Introduction
The term “biofunctional understanding” was introduced by Iran-Nejad in a technical report in 1980
and subsequently elaborated in a number of publications (e.g., Iran-Nejad and Ortony, 1984; Iran-
Nejad, 2000; Iran-Nejad and Stewart, 2011; Iran-Nejad and Bordbar, 2013). It is an especially apt
expression for the way we should approach a theory of human understanding. It reminds us that
we need to see how our capacities for understanding and reasoning are grounded in biological
processes of organism-environment interaction. The “bio” component refers to the fact that we are
biological organisms evolved both to sustain in our person the conditions of life and to enhance
its quality. The “functional” component refers to the fact that our activities as biological organisms
give rise to our capacity to perform a wide range of cognitive and affective functions. These specific
emerging functions define who and what we are, and they shape the way we make sense of our
experience, including all of our higher order cognitive operations. These life-sustaining and life-
enhancing functions are embodied in the sense that there is no mind, thought, valuing, or action
that is not in some way dependent upon our bodily makeup and patterns of engagement with our
world. In short, our very ability to understand our world and other people arises from the nature
of our bodily existence (including both our physical body and the structures and processes of our
brains) plus the embodied interactions we have with our material and cultural environments.
In this article, I shall attempt to explain how our bodily nature and activities give rise to
understanding, by which I mean our way of situating ourselves more or less successfully in the
world, in a manner that allows us to make sense of our surroundings, ourselves, other people,
and cultural institutions and practices. This embodied orientation challenges the unsatisfactory
notion of understanding as merely an abstract intellectual grasping of concepts and their relations. I
argue, instead, that understanding is a full-bodied, full-blooded, fully passionate process that reaches
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down into the visceral depths of our incarnate experience and
connects us functionally to our physical-cultural world.
Our Inherited Conception of Understanding
as Disembodied
The chief obstacle to employing the phrase “embodiment of
understanding” is that the dominant intellectual traditions within
Western culture have bequeathed to us a view of understanding
as either completely disembodied, or at least not primarily
dependent on the nature of our bodies and brains when it comes
to the structures and processes of our conceptualization and
reasoning. I begin, therefore, with a brief account of this received
folk theory of relatively disembodied understanding that stands
in the way of a deeper and more adequate appreciation of how the
body grounds and participates in mind. Although I have several
times (Johnson, 1987, 2007, 2014; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999) given
strong critiques of what I have called “disembodied” views of
mind, thought, and language, I have sometimes thought that this
is perhaps too strong a term for the views I am challenging, since
only the most extreme ontological dualists think that mind can
exist without a body. Instead, the view of disembodiment I am
criticizing is the assumption that the structures of our concepts,
understanding, and reason are not grounded in the nature of our
brains and our sensory, motor, and affective capacities. Therefore,
I regard any theory (including materialist theories of mind) that
tries to explain meaning, understanding, and reasoning without
detailed reference to the nature and workings of our bodies as
“disembodied” in the broad sense.
Although there is in the West a long history of disembodied
views of mind, thought, and language, for our purposes we
need only trace the history back to the Enlightenment faculty
psychology that has so fatefully shaped our commonsense and
theoretical views of mind down to the present day. The basic idea
of faculty psychology is that any achievement or operation we
attribute to creatures with minds can be explained in terms of
the activity of discrete powers or capacities (i.e., faculties) that
either individually or conjointly produce the various kinds of
judgments of which mind is capable. Each faculty supposedly
has its own distinct nature (essence) by virtue of which it
carries out certain specific functions, such as perceiving, feeling,
forming concepts, reasoning, judging, or willing. For example, our
ability to perceive objects allegedly depends upon our capacity
to passively receive sense impressions (of colors, textures, odors,
sounds) of objects in the world. This alleged faculty of sensation is
typically thought to cooperate with the faculty of imagination, by
which we order sensations into unified images or representations
that can persist over time. According tomost faculty psychologies,
full-blown knowledge of an object additionally requires a
faculty of understanding that supplies concepts for thinking (i.e.,
conceptualizing) the object that has been presented to our senses
and ordered by us into a unified image. Finally, we are supposed
to be able to then expand our knowledge by using our faculty of
reason to connect, according to the laws of logic, propositions into
larger units (systems) of knowledge. Faculty psychology strikes
most people in Western cultures as simple common sense, even
though it is an artifact of centuries of philosophical theories of
mind, thought, and knowledge.
Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume all had influential faculty
theories of mind and thought, but Kant’s famous account has
no doubt had the greatest influence on our current perspective.
To oversimplify a bit (though not unfairly), Kant thought of
understanding as the power to create concepts and to apply them
to sense contents or other representations to generate knowledge
of objects of experience. He regarded understanding as an activity
of judgment, where “all judgments are functions of unity among
our representations” (Kant, 1781, A69/B93-94). Understanding,
in Kant’s theory, performs unifying judgments that combine one
or more representations under some concept. He explains: “...
concepts rest on functions. By “function” I mean the unity of
the act of bringing various representations under one common
representation” (Kant, 1781, A68/B93). Concepts are thus formal
rules for ordering (i.e., making determinate in thought) various
images or other concepts. For instance, according to Kant’s view,
the concept chair would be a rule (of the faculty of understanding)
specifying the features that together constitute a given object as a
chair, and in this way the concept supposedly unifies a number of
sense impressions into an object of knowledge (e.g., a chair). More
general concepts can also unify subsidiary concepts, such as when
the concept furniture contains within it concepts for chairs, tables,
beds, sofas, etc. Concepts, for Kant, are thus formal structures,
insofar as they identify the necessary and sufficient properties
or features something must have to be that particular kind of
thing. Kant succinctly summarizes the relative contribution of
both intuitions (as the product of the faculty of sensations) and
concepts (as the product of the faculty of understanding): “Our
knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind;
the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity
for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object
through these representations (spontaneity in the production
of concepts).... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the
elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without
an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition
without concepts, can yield knowledge” (Kant, 1781, A50/B74).
As the past two centuries of Kant-influenced philosophy
and its critics have demonstrated, once you distinguish the
matter of sensations from the formal structure of concepts,
you cannot really explain how the two get combined in
acts of judgment. Once Humpty-Dumpty is broken (i.e., once
form (the concept) and matter (the sensations) are separated),
you cannot put Humpty back together again. In his famous
“Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding” (Kant,
1781, A137/B176—A147/B186), Kant attempted to bridge the
gap between the material of sensations supplied by the body
and the formal structuring supplied by the mind by finding a
third capacity—imagination—that supposedly has one foot in the
material and another in the formal, and somehow unites them in
one synthetic act. However, as has been well documented in Kant
scholarship, this unifying move leaves the faculty of imagination
a bit out in no man’s land. On the one hand, it seems bodily in the
way it constitutes images out of sensations. On the other hand,
it remains non-bodily in the way it generates formal schemata
(Johnson, 1987). This indeterminate status for imagination shows
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up in the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant sometimes aligns
imagination with sensing and our bodily formation of images and
other times with understanding and its capacity for spontaneously
generating synthesizing forms.
I cannot discuss the intricacies and problems of Kant’s schema-
tism here. It is enough for our purposes to recognize that unders-
tanding (Verstand) has been defined as a faculty of concepts and
conceptual unifying judgments, in contrast with the contribution
to knowledge made by the bodily processes of sense perception
and imagination. Concepts are the products of the synthesizing
power of the mind that allows us to grasp the form of objects
of knowledge. Kant insists that reason has an a priori structure
that makes possible logical relations and logical inference that are
supposedly in no way dependent for their structure on the bodily
makeup or experience of any reasoning being.
Kant was not a Cartesian substance dualist (where “mind”
and “body” are two different kinds of substance); rather, he has
a dualism that aligns sensing and feeling with the body, and
conceptualizing and reasoning with acts of a transcendent ego,
which is the source of a spontaneous organizing activity.
This “disembodied” view of understanding has seemed just
right to many so-called functionalist philosophers of mind,
since they regard mental operations as functional programs
for manipulating representations based only on their formal
(syntactic) properties. Kant’s view of determinate judgment
as a synthetic operation through which concepts and other
representations are combined into propositional judgments
having a subject-predicate structure perfectly fit the information
processing view of mind that arose in the middle of the last
century. On this view, sentences in natural languages are taken
to express subject-predicate propositions that can map onto
mind-independent aspects of the world, thus generating objective
knowledge of the world. Contemporary functionalist theories
of mind (such as Fodor’s (1981) program and the view Hilary
Putnam once held (Putnam, 1967) and later rejected) are good
examples of relatively disembodied views of mind. When Putnam
(1981, 1988) eventually came to reject his early functionalism, it
was precisely because it lacked the requisite bodily engagement
with the environment that is necessary for any understanding and
knowledge of the world.
The Embodiment of Understanding
To say that understanding is embodied requires a fundamentally
different orientation toward mind, thought, and language that
contrasts markedly with our received view of understanding
as an intellectual, disembodied, mostly conceptual process.
Embodied Cognition views start with the recognition that the
locus of all our human perception, meaning-making, valuing,
thought, and action is a series on ongoing organism-environment
interactions (Dewey, 1925). Humans are embodied creatures
that, before any other cognitive activities are possible, must first
maintain the requisite conditions for their bodily integrity and life
maintenance. Understanding is not just an intellectual operation,
but rather a series of full-bodied engagements with significant
aspects of one’s environment that are meaningful for them and
that sustain their life and growth, and this happens not just
at the physical level, but also at the interpersonal and cultural
levels. In other words, understanding is our way of making sense
of and inhabiting the world in which we live, so that we can
go forward with our lives. Understanding is thus less a form
of knowing or thinking than it is a matter of experiencing and
acting. To say that we understand something is to say that we
grasp its meaning in a way that allows us to be at least somewhat
“at home in” and not alienated from our world. “Grasping”
meaning is not restricted to an intellectual act, but is rather a
process of intelligent bodily organism-environment interaction.
This “intelligence” refers to our whole embodied engagement with
our surroundings, and not merely to some intellectual operation
of thought. We “understand” some object, event, or idea when
we grasp its significance for past, present, and future activity and
are able to carry that understanding forward into new experience.
Therefore, understanding is a form of embodied adaptive and
transformative experience, since developing a new understanding
actually remakes experience.
Let us consider in more detail and depth the steps of the
argument in the previous paragraph. To develop an adequate
understanding of experience, the starting point must be
organism-environment coupling through which both organism
and environment change over time and establish new relations.
In order to have a viable organism, you need a body—that is, a
living physical bodily structure with an interior and an exterior
that are demarcated by a semi-permeable boundary that allows
the organism to take in energy, excrete waste, and operate
with relative integrity. Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio nicely
summarizes the conditions for an organism’s management of its
life functions in relation to its surroundings:
(L)ife requires that the body maintain a collection of
parameter ranges at all costs for literally dozens of
components in its dynamic interior. All the management
operations to which I alluded earlier—procuring energy
sources, incorporating and transforming energy products,
and so forth—aim at maintaining the chemical parameters
of a body’s interior (internal milieu) within the magic
range compatible with life. The magic range is known as
homeostatic, and the process of achieving this balanced state
is called homeostasis. (Damasio, 2010, p. 42)
This grounding in organism/environment interactions means
that, as both James (1890) and Dewey (1925) argued, we must
not base our account of understanding on any abstractions from
experience, such as “sensations,” “concepts,” “propositions,” or
“knowledge judgments.” To cite just one example, we must avoid
the classical empiricist error of assuming that all experience begins
with atomistic sense impressions that have to be synthesized,
via associative processes, into unified perceptual judgments.
Contrast this erroneous view with the fact that what we
actually experience are whole, unified situations, within which
we experience individual objects, qualities, and events through
the selective discriminations by which we individuate aspects of
our experience. If we keep in mind that experience includes both
the structure and activity of the organism as well as the structure
of the environment, we will appreciate how bodily processes are
absolutely crucial for the possibility of any form of cognition,
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feeling, or action, and we will not abstract away from the body
and its environments. Otherwise, we end up selecting some part
or phase of an experience and then mistakenly assuming that
what we have selected out (a sensation, quality, concept, image,
judgment) defines the whole of that experience, in all its depth
and richness.
The second important point is that the homeostasis necessary
for life should be thought of as what Jay Schulkin (2011) calls
allostasis—a dynamic equilibrium in which the organism can, as
it interacts with its environment in an ongoing fashion, establish
a new equilibrium set-point, and does not merely return to
some pre-established, fixed set-point. According to Luu and
Tucker (2003) “allostasis can be defined as the regulation of
many variables (including behavioral as well as physiological
variables) over time to meet motive set-points that are established
dynamically... Rather than just responding to deviations from
fixed set-points, allostasis allows the organism to anticipate needs
and to adjust configurations of regulatory goals in advance tomeet
those needs” (Luu andTucker, 2003, pp. 125–126). It is onlywithin
a bounded organism that homeostasis or allostasis are possible, so,
once again, we must keep our focus on the nature and conditions
of the embodied organism in its many environments.
The third key point is that it is always within the context
of organism-environment transactions that values arise and
influence behavior. Our experience is value-laden all the way
down to the primitive emergence of the values required for life
maintenance. Damasio concludes, “I see value as indelibly tied
to need, and need as tied to life. The valuations we establish in
everyday social and cultural activities have a direct and indirect
connection with homeostasis.... Value relates directly or indirectly
to survival. In the case of humans in particular, value also relates
to the quality of that survival in the form ofwell-being” (Damasio,
2010, pp. 47–48). This last sentence is crucial, insofar as it
recognizes that, for creatures as complex and interrelated as we
are, our primitive values include not just maintenance of bodily
equilibrium necessary for life, but also maintenance of social and
cultural equilibrium within larger communities.
Because the focus of my argument is not directly on values, I
will not elaborate Damasio’s extensive and nuanced treatment of
the origin and development of human values (see Damasio, 2003).
I emphasize the pervasiveness of value only to emphasize that
understanding is irreducibly value-laden and tied to our specific
environments, both physical and social/cultural. Understanding
is not just a matter of concepts and propositions capturing some
aspect of the world; rather, it is a matter of appropriately situating
and enabling purposive action in the world, relative to our well-
being.
I also want to highlight the way in which values first emerge
from our bodily, interpersonal, and communal needs, which
are realized primarily in and through our bodily activities. In
short, “the values that humans attribute to objects and activities
would bear some relation, no matter how indirect or remote, to
the two following conditions: first, the general maintenance of
living tissue within the homeostatic range suitable to its current
context; second, the particular regulation required for the process
to operate within the sector of the homeostatic range associated
with well-being relative to the current context” (Damasio, 2010,
p. 49). Note that the “current context” referred to here would
typically be not merely our physical surroundings, but equally our
interpersonal and communal relations.
Emotional Dimensions of Understanding
The next (i.e., fourth) characteristic of our embodied
understanding is so important that it deserves its own separate
heading. The tendency to regard understanding as an intellectual,
cognitive, conceptual, or propositional activity has led to the
downplaying or even denial of any role for emotion and feeling.
On the face of it, such a separation is ludicrous, but that has not
stopped committed cognitivists from excluding emotions from
the domain of understanding, or even from regarding emotions
as contrary to acts of understanding. Nothing could be farther
from the truth.
To see immediately why this dismissal of emotion is such a
devastating mistake, we need a brief consideration of the nature
and function of emotions in humans (and other animals). Here
again, Damasio’s work has been quite influential, based on his
extensive research on the role of emotions and feelings in the
formation of self, the emergence of consciousness, and the nature
of our values. The whole story of emotions, feelings, and their
neural and chemical substrates is quite long and detailed, but a
few key points are relevant to the argument I am making here.
Put simply, emotions are neural-chemical-bodily response
patterns resulting from an organism’s monitoring of its changing
body-state as it interacts with things in its environment.
These responses are generated—mostly unconsciously and
automatically—when the organism detects some “emotionally
competent stimulus” (Damasio, 2003, p. 53) that the organism
registers as requiring some change in its body-state. Most of these
response patterns for the basic emotions have been established
and sedimented over our evolutionary history. “The ultimate
result of the responses, directly or indirectly, is the placement
of the organism in circumstances conducive to survival and
well-being” (Damasio, 2003, p. 53). Consequently, emotions
are the result of our most important capacities to appraise our
situation in order to act appropriately within it. Most emotional
response patterns are automatic and operate beneath our
reflective awareness, but sometimes they are also accompanied
with feelings of those emotions, in which cases we are able to
be consciously aware of the felt changes in our body-state as it
engages its environments. In short, emotional response patterns
constitute the body’s (mostly unconscious) registering of how it
is being altered by its engagement with its surroundings, and we
feel an emotional state whenever we become conscious of those
changes in our body state. So, we can be in an emotional state
without necessarily being aware (through feeling) that we are in
that specific state. That is why, for example, we can be angry, even
before we feel angry.
Emotional response patterns and emotional feelings thus lie
at the heart of our capacity to understand the various situations
in which we find ourselves. Emotional response patterns emerge
because of their general, though not always complete, suitability
for helping us survive and enhance the quality of our existence.
Consequently, our ability to understand what is happening in a
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developing situation, as well as figuring out what it means for us,
is dependent on our emotional makeup.
Emotions are therefore an integral part of human
understanding and meaning. I use the term “meaning” here
in the way it was understood by the classical American Pragmatist
philosophers. Basically, any thing (object, quality, event,
person, idea) has meaning just insofar as it points to some
experience, either past, present, or future (projected) that is for
us connected with it. Things are meaningful because they afford
us various possible experiences. For example, with respect to
past experience, the term “gun” might have a complex meaning
that recalls your experience with guns, the history of changing
weapons technologies, knowledge of your culture’s use of and
attitude toward guns, and the history of gun violence, both at
home and abroad. In your present experience, the meaning is
tied to certain objects (guns) that you can see, handle, and use
in various ways. This would include our visual experience of
guns and our motor programs for using guns. In relation to
our projected future, gun might afford various possibilities for
certain definite kinds of experiences, such as hunting, target
practice, warfare, mass shootings, police practices, and criminal
operations. This Pragmatist conception of meaning is not just
tied to words in a language, for it stretches out to include any
form of symbolic activity in which meaning can emerge (e.g.,
painting, sculpture, architecture, music, dance, spontaneous
bodily gestures, ritual practices, etc.). This means that our
understanding of guns will include a vast body of visual, tactile,
auditory, gestural, movement, object manipulation, and other
possible experiences.
Within such a broad notion of meaning, emotions can play a
crucial role, because they direct us toward tendencies for past,
present, and future experiences. Emotional response patterns
indicate, at the deepest levels of our engagement with our world,
the perceived values to us of things and activities and the
tendencies of various qualities, objects, and events. Brentano
(1874) argued that the mark of the mental is intentionality—the
directedness of a mental state toward some object. Emotions
exhibit intentionality just asmuch as linguistic terms and concepts
do. Emotions point to andmark the character of various situations
in which we find ourselves. My joy this morning is not merely
an internal mental state locked within my body-mind, but rather
it marks the character of my world as it stretches out before me
and affords me various possible experiences andmodes of activity
and response. Instead of saying merely that I am joyful, it is
more accurate to say that my situation—my mode of being in the
world—is joyful.
It is in this broad sense that emotions are just as much a crucial
part of understanding as concepts and propositions are. Emotions
are one of our primary and most important ways of taking the
measure of our situation. They are appraisal processes that help
us to orient ourselves meaningfully within a certain context and
to grasp various possibilities for meaning and action.
Understanding Concrete Concepts
Those who are enamored of disembodied views of understanding
will claim that embodiment views cannot adequately account
for the full range of human conceptualization, reasoning, and
language. While they may grant that structures of embodied
meaning play a role in the semantics of ordinary concrete physical
objects and events, they will insist that abstract concepts cannot
be grounded in these embodied structures of meaning. So, the
important question arises: How do we get from the dimensions
of embodied understanding sketched above to our full capacity
for abstract symbols and formal reasoning? The answer lies with
the recruitment of sensory and motor capacities to perform
conceptualization and rational inference.
Before considering abstract understanding, let us first consider
the role of the body in how we understand the meaning of a
simple physical object like a cup. Barsalou (1999) has pointed
out that the meaning of concrete physical objects is not merely
some abstract feature list of properties that supposedly define that
kind of thing. He explains, “a concept is not a single abstracted
representation for a category, but is instead a skill for constructing
idiosyncratic representations tailored to the current needs of the
situated action” (Barsalou, 2003, p. 521). The meaning of an
object, and our conception of it, involves our simulation, via
functional neuronal clusters involved with sensory, motor, and
affective experiences, of various actual and possible interactions
with the things we call cups. In other words, the meaning of any
object would be the kinds of experiences we have had, are now
having, or might someday have, with that sort of thing. For a
cup, for example, some of these experiences would be visual—the
various views we might have of different cups as we regard them
from multiple perspectives. Most of those views would present
the perceiver with a physical container structure that has a three
dimensional boundary with an interior and an exterior, capable
of holding liquids and solid substances. Some cups would have
handles, others would not. Some would be delicate china, others
thick and heavy, and still others thin and made of cheap materials
(paper, plastic, etc.). Our concept of a cup is not limited merely to
visual simulations, however. Our visual simulations of cups would
be coupled with simulations of the tactile and motor interactions
we have, ormight have, with various kinds of cups.Neural imaging
studies show that when we see a cup, we are not only having
activations in the visual areas of the brain, but also activation
of motor programs and tactile sensations. Seeing a cup will thus
activate areas in the motor and pre-motor cortex that would be
involved in touching and handling cups, even though we are not
actually handling them (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005). These motor
simulations would include operations such as the arm, hand, and
finger movements that are necessary to grip cups of various types,
sizes, andmaterials, and to raise them to our lips, take a drink, and
return them to a table. Thus, there would be the motor synergies
(activated in motor cortex in the brain) required to partially close
each finger, with just the right force so that we do not either drop
or break the cup. These hand and finger movements also need to
be coordinated and sequenced into a fluid hand-closing gripping
gesture that is just right for the size, location, andmaterial makeup
of the cup. This sequencing is done in the pre-motor cortex.
Our visual, tactile, auditory, and motor simulations of
perceptions of, and interactions with, cups are still not the whole
story. An adequate account would need to include what are
traditionally called the “esthetic” dimensions of our experiences
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with cups. This would involve aspects such as our experiences
with the different types of cups (e.g., fine china tea cups, mugs,
paper cups, plastic cups) that figure in the meaning of cup. It
would also need to include our sense of the social and cultural
contexts in which these different types of cups are appropriately
used (e.g., tea ceremonies, dinner parties,meetings in cafes, family
meals, picnics, beer parties). These latter activities constitute
what are known in cognitive linguistics as “frames,” which are
complex event structures that have roles for agents, objects,
actions, causation, purposes, outcomes, and so forth (Fillmore,
1982; Lakoff, 1987; Feldman, 2006).
Our understanding of something as ordinary as a cup actually
turns out to be a fairly complex blending of simulated perceptions,
emotions, and actions associated with the things we call cups,
within specific social and cultural contexts. It involves bodily
activities of perception of qualities, forms, spatial locations,
internal structure, spatial relations, etc., and also activities of
simulated body movement and object manipulation that are
appropriate in various cultural settings. This embodied account of
understanding and meaning has come to be known as Simulation
Semantics. In his book, Louder than Words: The New Science of
how theMindMakesMeaning (Bergen, 2012), has presented scores
of experiments showing how semantic simulation operates as we
hear and read sentences and grasp theirmeaning. He calls his view
the “embodied simulation hypothesis,” which asserts that “we
understand language by simulating in our minds what it would be
like to experience the things that the language describes” (Bergen,
2012, p. 13).
The crucial moral I draw from this research on simulation
semantics is that understanding is not just an intellectual
operation on disembodied concepts, ideas, or representations.
Instead, understanding is a profoundly bodily process of
experiential simulation that uses complexly interconnected
brain regions responsible for all sorts of perceptual and motor
activities, aswell as emotional responses and feelings. It is critically
important to keep in mind that the embodied simulations I have
described here are typically not conscious reflective acts, but
rather are carried out automatically and very rapidly, usually
beneath the level of our conscious awareness. In other words, we
do not actually have to consciously imagine that we are seeing
or handling a cup, even though the functional neural ensembles
required for these simulations are activated in our brains.
Understanding Abstract Concepts
Up to this point, I have considered only our embodied
understanding of the concrete physical object cup. But that is
merely a small part of the larger story of humanunderstanding, for
we have to include some account of the bodily grounding of our
understanding of abstract concepts like mind, knowledge, love,
justice, fear, cooperation, etc. Explaining the possibility of abstract
understanding is a vast project, so here I must be content to give a
few examples of how parts of a comprehensive theory of the bodily
basis of abstract understanding could be developed. Consider, for
example, the abstract notion of a state, such as being hot, cold,
weak, invigorated, in love, depressed, or in trouble. Notice that in
English (and most languages) we speak of states as if they were
metaphorical locations into and out of which some object, event,
or person could move. Thus, we use the language of physical
location and motion to metaphorically understand changes of
state, as in “Thewaterwent from cold tohot in amatter ofminutes,”
“He fell in love,” “She clawed her way out of her depression,”
“He keeps getting into trouble,” and “She fell deep into debt when
her hedge fund collapsed.” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999)
observed that such conceptualizations of change of state involve
a conceptual metaphor in which we understand being in a state
metaphorically as being within a bounded location. Change of state
is understood as movement from one state-location to another.
The metaphor here is a conceptual mapping across two different
experiential domains, namely, physical locations/motions and
abstract states and changes of state (typically either physical states
or psychological/emotional states). The underlying metaphor,
which we named the Location Event Structure metaphor, consists
of the following mapping:
 States Are Locations
 Change of State is Motion From One Location to Another
 Manner of Change is Manner of Motion
 Means of Attaining a Goal are Paths of Motion
 Causes Are Physical Forces
 Causation Is ForcedMovement from one Location toAnother
 Difficulties are Impediments to Motion
 Purposes are Desired Locations (Destinations)
 Progress Toward Goal is Motion Along a Path
In English (and most other languages around the world), there
are hundreds of linguistic expressions that manifest these basic
mappings. Thus, we say things like “She’s in a funk” (State As
Location), “He went from good to bad” (Change Of State As
Movement From One Location To Another), “This is the way to
happiness” (Means To Goal Is A Path). “Her death pushed me
over the edge” (Causation Is ForcedMovement), “He just stumbled
into the relationship with her” (Manner Of Change Is Manner Of
Motion), “Don’t let your fear keep you from going where you want
to be in life” (Difficulties Are Impediments To Motion), and “I’m
half-way to paradise” (Progress Toward Goal Is Motion Along A
Path).
Notice that the source domain in conceptual metaphors
through which we understand the target is nearly always
some experience of bodily perception, motion, feeling, personal
interaction, or social relations (often those within a family). The
mechanism involved is a recruitment of entities, qualities, and
structures involved in perception, feeling, bodily movement, etc.,
to construct understanding of an abstract domain. In our present
case of the Location Event Structure metaphor, one of the key
structures is what Lakoff (1987) and I (Johnson, 1987) called the
Container image schema, which consists of the followingminimal
structure:
 A boundary
 An interior
 An exterior
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As we saw earlier, the Container schema was actually involved
in our understanding of the meaning of cup, since cups have a
three dimensional boundary that defines an interior and exterior.
There are scores of image schemas, such as container,
object, source-path-goal, near-far, up-down, center-periphery,
right-left, straight-curved, forced motion, degree of intensity,
balance, iteration, and on and on (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987;
Hampe and Grady, 2005). Image schemas emerge first in our
mundane unreflective bodily engagement with our environment,
as recurring patterns of our corporeal/spatial experience. They
can be realized in multiple modalities, such as vision, touch, taste,
and hearing (Dodge and Lakoff, 2005).
Importantly, these image-schematic structures and
relationships are not limited to cases of concrete objects and
actions. Their structure and logic can also be appropriated for
abstract understanding, such as when, as we just saw above, a State
is understood metaphorically as a Location (which is a bounded
region, and hence a two- or three-dimensional container). For
understanding and reasoning about abstract states, we recruit
our knowledge of the source domain, which will have its own
corporeal or spatial logic, to draw inferences about the target
domain. In the present example, the relevant logic is that of the
Container schema, such as:
1. If you are in a container (bounded region), you are not outside
of it.
2. If you are outside a bounded region and cross the closed
boundary, you will at some point end up within the bounded
region (container).
3. If object O is in Container A, and Container A is in Container
B, the object O is in Container B.
This image-schematic logic applies, not just to physical
containers or bounded spaces, but to abstract containers like
states, mathematical sets, institutions, etc. (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff
andNunez, 2000). Thus, if I am kicked out of the Beautiful Persons
Club, then, by the embodied logic of Containment, I know I’m no
longer in the club. Or if I use the mathematical metaphor of Sets
As Containers, then I get, from (3) above, the logical principle of
Transitivity: All A are B, All B are C, so All A are C, and this holds
for any kind of abstract entity (as metaphorical container) I can
imagine within a set-theoretical logic.
So far, the vast majority of research on image schemas and
their logics has been based on linguistic and conceptual analysis
showing how, in languages all over the world, these basic
structures (1) underlie the meanings of terms for physical entities,
states, and relations, and (2) shape our understanding of and
reasoning, via conceptual metaphor, about abstract concepts.
However, in addition to this cognitive linguistic analysis, there is
now an emerging theory of the neural structures and processes
underlying image schemas (see Dodge and Lakoff, 2005 for a brief
summary). There is also a complementary neural treatment of
conceptual metaphor (Feldman, 2006; Lakoff, 2008). Lakoff and
Srini Narayanan provide the most extensive cognitive linguistic
and neural account of both of these phenomena in their
forthcoming book, How Brains Think.
Bio-functional Embodied Understanding
Human understanding is profoundly embodied. That is, it is
rooted in how our bodies and brains interact with, process,
and understand our environments in a way that recruits bodily
meaning, neural simulation, and feeling to carry out both concrete
and abstract conceptualization and reasoning. “Embodiment”
is thus not an add-on to the notion of the bio-functional
grounding of human understanding. It is integral to that notion.
To say that understanding is bio-functional is necessarily to say
that it is embodied, because the relevant functional operations
are those of an embodied organism in ongoing engagement
with its material, interpersonal, and cultural environments. This
perspective overthrows centuries of disembodied views that either
deny or overlook the way our bodies, functioning within our
changing environments, generate meaning, thought, and, I might
add, values (Johnson, 2014).
We obviously do not yet have the full story of embodied
understanding—how it is worked up in our formative experience,
how it emerges in and is realized through our bodies and
brains, how it undergirds and shapes our conceptualization
and reasoning, and how it allows us to be “at home” in our
world through our bodily engagement with our surroundings.
However, we are beginning to develop the tools, techniques, and
experimental methods for studying the nature and operation of
our bio-functional understanding in sufficient detail to make it
clear why we must never again revert to disembodied views of
mind, thought, language, and values.
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